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INTRODUCTION 
When the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established in 1873, the United States 
impliedly reserved and retained water rights sufficient to establish a homeland for the Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe then and into the future. In the present water rights adjudication, the United States 
claimed such federal water rights consistent with the purpose of the Reservation when created, 
mindful of changes in Reservation use since that time. The various water-rights claims reflect the 
dual nature of the Reservation’s homeland purpose: to support continuation of the Tribe’s 
traditional practices including hunting, fishing, gathering, and cultural activities; and to facilitate 
a move toward “modern” activities like agricultural, commercial, and industrial activities.  
Objectors to these water rights claims—including the State of Idaho, the North Idaho 
Water Rights Group (“NIWRG”), and Hecla Limited (collectively, “Objectors”)—seek to restrict 
the rights of use that are part of the overall reserved water right, arguing that certain traditional 
tribal activities and certain modern tribal activities are supposed “secondary” uses of the 
Reservation for which there is no reserved water right. Their arguments mistakenly presume that 
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established—and that water rights were thereby impliedly 
reserved—for only specific narrow purposes (e.g., to provide agricultural land to the Tribe) as 
opposed to the broad purpose of providing a tribal homeland. Our opening brief demonstrated 
that this cramped view of the Tribe’s reserved water rights is incorrect.  
But even if the Water Court correctly adopted this narrow understanding of Indian 
reserved rights, the record in this case amply demonstrates that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation 
was established for purposes that entail the reservation of water for purposes beyond agricultural, 
domestic, fishing, and hunting uses—for the gathering of roots and berries on the Reservation, 
for current and planned commercial and industrial activities on the Reservation, and for all uses 
of Lake Coeur d’Alene that the Supreme Court established were instrumental to the Tribe at the 
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time of the Reservation’s creation. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (“Idaho II”).  
The Water Court also erred when it ruled that the Tribe could not hold rights to maintain 
instream flows needed to protect its fishery if those flows were outside the boundary of the 
Reservation. Contrary to Objectors’ defense of this ruling, neither the biological needs of the 
Tribe’s fishery nor the associated reserved instream flow water rights are not constrained by 
political boundaries. The instream flows are validly tied to the Tribe’s downstream on-
Reservation use, not to any purported interest in or right to regulate upstream lands.  
Finally, the Water Court erred when it determined that certain reserved water rights for in 
situ water use to maintain seeps, springs, and wetlands have a priority matching the date of 
reacquisition, as opposed to time-immemorial priority. These water rights on reacquired lands 
are not meaningfully different from the same rights on lands that were never transferred from 
federal ownership during the brief allotment era.  
ARGUMENT 
I. Under Winters, the United States’ reservation of land for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
impliedly reserved all water rights necessary to fulfill its Reservation’s purpose as 
the Tribe’s permanent homeland.  
There is no dispute among the parties that the federal reserved rights claimed here are 
governed by the reserved rights doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Winters v. 
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Objectors, however, misinterpret Winters and its progeny in 
determining the reserved right for the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. 
Initially, Hecla wrongly argues that a claimed federal reservation of water must be 
“carefully balanced” against state law. Hecla Br. 16. To the contrary, federal reserved rights arise 
under and are wholly governed by federal law. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138–39 
(1976); see also infra note 15. The needs that motivated the federal reservation, which predated 
Statehood, are not altered by state law, and the federal government “does not defer to state water 
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law with respect to reserved rights.” Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley 
Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 468, 469 (2017). There is no 
state law component in assessing federal reserved water rights claims, and Hecla’s “balancing” 
proposition has no legal support. 
In Winters, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when the United States set aside an Indian 
reservation, it impliedly reserved sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, with 
the priority date established as no later than the date of the reservation. See 207 U.S. at 576.1 
Determining what water rights have been reserved requires an inquiry into the purposes of the 
particular reservation as evidenced by the reservation-creating documents, the particular tribe’s 
history, and the context of the reservation’s establishment, including the many factors relevant to 
the negotiations between the government and the tribe leading to any agreement. See generally 
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981). Agreements between 
the federal government and a tribe “ ‘must . . . be construed, not according to the technical 
meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be 
understood by the Indians.’ ” City of Pocatello v. State, 180 P.3d 1048, 1057 (Idaho 2008) 
(quoting Washington v. Wash. State Comm’l Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979) 
(“Fishing Vessel”)). For that reason, too, the State is wrong in asserting that the reservation of 
water under the Winters doctrine for a particular purpose requires that the purpose of a 
                                                          
1 Hecla’s additional suggestion that a federal reservation of water must be express (Hecla 
Br. 1, 20), is also in direct conflict with Winters, which was founded on the simple recognition 
that a reservation without water to make it serve as a tribe’s “permanent home” would be 
“valueless,” and a tribe could not be understood to give up its ancestral lands without necessary 
water rights. 207 U.S. at 565, 576. Just as Winters did not depend on “[state] water law,” an 
“express reservation of water rights,” or “legislative history . . . referring to water rights or the 
need for water rights” (Hecla Br. 1, 20), the implied federal reserved water rights claimed in this 
adjudication do not depend on state water law, an express reservation of water, or legislative 
history. 
 4  
 
 
reservation’s establishment have been “clearly expressed by Congress.” State Br. 7.2  
It has been long recognized that the fundamental purpose of an Indian reservation is to 
provide a home for Indian people. Tribes relinquished large portions of their ancestral lands for 
confinement to significantly smaller reservations through exchanges that must be interpreted to 
involve fair and adequate consideration. As stated in Winters, a tribe cannot be understood to 
“give up” its “command of the lands and waters” in exchange for a smaller piece of land unless 
that land can provide a living for the tribe. 207 U.S. at 576. A “livable” reservation requires 
sufficient water to provide for both present and future needs of a tribe. Arizona v. California, 373 
U.S. 546, 599, 600 (1963) (“Arizona I”). And determining the quantum of water impliedly 
reserved in connection with any particular tribal reservation is answered by examination of the 
historical circumstances of the tribe and reservation-creating documents at issue.  
Here, the Water Court properly recognized that “[t]here is no doubt that the United States 
intended to move the Coeur d’Alene people onto the lands reserved to be the reservation with the 
aim that those lands be their homeland,” R.4319. But the Water Court failed to give proper effect 
to this determination by rejecting the “homeland” purpose as informing the determination of all 
reserved water rights claimed for the Tribe, as well as the quantification of those rights. The 
Objectors wrongly rely on United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), in asserting that 
the Water Court properly limited the Tribes’ rights to use of water for specific purposes (e.g., 
                                                          
2 Relatedly, while the State suggests that only “Congress” may express legitimate 
“primary purposes” of a reservation, it is well established that reservations established by 
executive order are equally valid as those established by other means. See, e.g., Spalding v. 
Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 403 (1896) (“When Indian reservations were created, either by treaty or 
executive order, the Indians held the land by the same character of title, to wit, the right to 
possess and occupy the lands for the uses and purposes designated.” (emphasis added)); Arizona 
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) (Winters doctrine of implied water rights applies to 
reservations established by executive order). 
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irrigated agriculture) that form a supposed “primary” purpose of the Reservation, while properly 
denying rights of use for supposed “secondary purposes” (e.g., industrial or commercial uses, 
plant gathering, and various other traditional activities) that allegedly were not reservation 
purposes at the time of establishment. That argument misrepresents New Mexico. That decision 
addressed implied water rights for a federal reservation of land as a national forest in which 
Congress expanded the scope of managing that forest long after it was established. The Supreme 
Court held that the later-added purposes were “secondary” and did not inform the nature and 
extent of the water right reserved when the forest was first created. 438 U.S. at 715. New Mexico 
has no proper application here, where there has been no post-establishment change to the Coeur 
d’Alene Reservation upon which to base any conceivable distinctions between primary and 
secondary purposes in determining what water rights were reserved or preserved when the 
reservation was established. Nothing in New Mexico prevents the Court from recognizing that the 
Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established to be a tribal “homeland” and from adjudicating 
specific rights of water use based on that purpose and on the presumption that uses associated 
with a permanent homeland necessarily are broad and subject to evolution.  
Nor is the State correct (State Br. 4) that adjudicating the Tribe’s reserved rights based on 
a permanent tribal “homeland” purpose would render the reserved right unlimited. The water 
reserved by establishment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation is dependent upon actual traditional 
use and reasonably anticipated future use at the time the Reservation was established in 1873. 
The United States does not claim unlimited water rights, but rather claims specific water rights 
based on the Tribe’s historical use of its ancestral territory and “modern” types of water use that 
could have been reasonably anticipated in 1873, as informed by actual evolving uses of the 
Reservation. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & 
Source, 35 P.3d 68, 77 (Ariz. 2001) (“Gila V”). As a practical matter, the claimed consumptive 
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use rights amount to merely one percent of the total outflow of the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River 
Basin, belying Objectors’ claimed fears of limitless tribal water appropriation. R.2675–76, ⁋ 99.3 
The State questions the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Gila V, arguing that it rests 
on “infirm foundations” and “is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents and that of most 
jurisdictions.” State Br. 8. To the contrary, Gila V did nothing more in than apply the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s approach in Winters and Arizona I, appropriately recognizing that the Indian 
reservations at issue were “created” to provide tribes with a “ ‘permanent home and abiding 
place,’ . . . that is, a ‘livable’ environment.” 35 P.3d at 74 (citation omitted). Those decisions 
hardly present “infirm foundations”; rather, they represent the bedrock precedent necessarily 
applicable to the reserved water right claims presented here.4 The State insists that Gila V 
inappropriately ignored historical evidence of intent, but in fact the court simply recognized that 
historical documents have limited utility in the context of an “implied” (“not express”) right, 
particularly because documents tend to “focus only on the motives” of the federal government 
and not the motives of tribes. Id. at 75. While the State asserts discomfort with Gila V’s 
recognition of “flexibility” in determining the scope of reserved water rights (State Br. 9), 
flexibility is fully consistent with the premise of Arizona I that a reservation is intended to meet 
present and future tribal needs. 373 U.S. at 600; see also Walton, 647 F.2d at 47. Nor does the 
State offer a rebuttal to the Ninth Circuit’s determination in Agua Caliente that the “general 
                                                          
3 The State did not object to this Joint Statement of Fact. See R.3375. 
4 According to the State (Br. 4), the fact that Winters and Arizona I involved agricultural 
water rights claims suggests that claims to reserved water rights for other activities are invalid. 
That is incorrect: courts applying Winters and Arizona I have routinely determined that water 
uses impliedly reserved upon the establishment of Indian reservations include traditional water 
uses and other uses consistent with a reservation’s “homeland” purpose. See United States v. 
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408–11 (9th Cir. 1983); Walton, 647 F.2d at 47–48; Agua Caliente, 849 
F.3d 1262. 
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purpose” of an Indian reservation is “to create a home for the Tribe,” and that “water was 
necessarily implicated in that purpose.” 849 F.3d at 1270 (citing Walton, 647 F.2d at 47).  
Establishment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation involved vigorous efforts by the Tribe to 
retain land rights, coupled with resistance to restrictions on tribal access to valuable lands and 
waters that had been historically occupied and enjoyed. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 266, 276. The Tribe 
ultimately relinquished “vast acreage” in what is now Idaho in exchange for the promise of a 
permanent, protected home on its Reservation. Id. at 262. The Tribe did not “give up all this,” 
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576, to be left with a home without water, as that would be no home at all. 
The United States’ water rights claims on behalf of the Tribe properly represent rights impliedly 
reserved for the Tribe as part of this bargain that the Water Court failed to recognize in its 
cramped decision.5  
II. A water right for maintenance of the level of Lake Coeur d’Alene is necessary to 
ensure the fulfillment of all aspects of the purpose identified in Idaho II. 
The United States claimed a water right for the Tribe based on the Tribe’s use of Lake 
Coeur d’Alene for a number of traditional activities recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Idaho II. The Water Court nonetheless rejected the claim for maintenance of the Lake’s level for 
all uses other than hunting and fishing. As detailed in the United States’ opening brief (at 18–22), 
the Water Court’s ruling is in conflict with Idaho II’s recognition that the United States created a 
reservation for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe that would facilitate all of the Tribe’s traditional uses of 
the Lake. Just as the Supreme Court determined that the importance of these traditional activities 
helped overcome the presumption that the Lake’s submerged lands would pass to the State of 
                                                          
5 As noted in the United States’ opening brief (at 18 n. 8), to the extent the Court 
disagrees that the establishment of the Tribe’s reservation has a single “homeland” purpose and 
instead has multiple individual purposes, the Court should construe the United States’ argument 
herein as supporting the individual purposes that the Water Court rejected. 
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Idaho, the importance of these traditional activities also demonstrates an implied right to 
maintain a water level in the Lake. Failing to address the United States’ argument that Idaho II 
answers the question of the Lake’s central role in the creation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, 
the State misses the mark by asserting a series of misplaced practical and legal arguments.6  
The State’s principle theory is that the Tribe lost whatever reserved water right it held in 
Lake Coeur d’Alene when it agreed to a reduced-size reservation in 1889. But the State can 
identify no cession of water rights in the Lake, because no such cession has occurred. The State’s 
argument ultimately confuses two separate concepts, namely, ownership of submerged lands and 
ownership of a water right. These are distinct legal rights that may be held simultaneously (as 
here); however, a water right does not necessarily depend on ownership of submerged lands, nor 
does ownership of submerged lands depend on a water right. Indeed, linking water rights to 
ownership of lands along or under a waterway is antithetical to the very concept of Idaho’s prior 
appropriation regime, which is premised on use of water and not on ownership of lands. 
Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 101 P. 1059, 1062 (Idaho 1909) (“A riparian proprietor 
in the state of Idaho has no right in or claim to the waters of a stream flowing by or through his 
lands that he can successfully assert as being prior or superior to the rights and claims of one 
who has appropriated or diverted the water of the stream and is applying it to a beneficial use.”). 
Whether the Tribe agreed to cede a portion of the Lake’s submerged lands has no bearing on 
whether the Tribe ceded its right to maintain water in the Lake. The State identifies no historical 
evidence that the Tribe understood its 1889 cession of certain lands to leave it with no right to 
maintain the level of the portion of the Lake within its Reservation, and without explicit 
abandonment of the right the Tribe continues to hold the right. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
                                                          
6 Only the State’s answering brief addresses the Lake claim directly.  
 9  
 
 
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (federal government’s termination of Indians’ recognized 
rights must be explicit). 
The State further contends that the Tribe has no right to maintain water levels in the Lake 
because the entire Lake does not fall within the current boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation. Arguing without citation to any authority, the State baldly asserts (State Br. 18) that 
when “a water body has split ownership, one party cannot claim the unilateral right to maintain a 
specific lake elevation, because such right, if recognized, necessarily imposes a lake elevation 
upon all owners of the water body.” In addition to lacking legal support, the State’s argument 
also suffers from inconsistent application in the real world: while the State argues here that one 
sovereign (i.e., the Tribe) cannot hold a lake-level right that would affect another sovereign’s 
right (i.e., the State), the state claims its own and nearly-identical water right for the maintenance 
of a level of Lake Coeur d’Alene “for all the inhabitants of the state,” which “imposes” a lake 
elevation on the Tribe, the co-owner of the water body. See State Water Right 95-2067, available 
at https://go.usa.gov/xnF78; Idaho Code § 67-4304; Idaho II, 533 U.S. 262 (holding that the 
United States holds submerged lands underlying a portion of Lake Coeur d’Alene in trust for the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe). 
The State mistakenly relies (State Br. 19) on Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 
(1982), for its assertion that there must be an “apportionment” of water rights between 
competing sovereign interests on a single water body. Colorado has no application here, as it 
concerned consumptive (i.e., diversionary) water rights, not an in-situ non-consumptive water 
right like the federal reserved right for maintenance of the Lake’s level. The factors bearing on 
the consumptive right claim at issue in Colorado have no proper place in considering a claim for 
a non-consumptive right. See, 459 U.S. at 183 (listing factors to be considered, including “the 
practical effect of wasteful uses”). The State contends (State Br. 19) that “the principles that 
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underlie such doctrine” should be applied to the United States’ claim for maintenance of lake 
level. But the principle of equitable apportionment of consumptive uses is based on the notion 
that sovereigns are competing for diversionary water rights. As noted above, the Lake-level 
claim does not involve any diversionary water right, and there is no competition between 
sovereigns. Rather, there is mutual benefit to sovereigns: the Tribe benefits from the State’s 
currently-recognized right to hold water in the Lake, and the State will likewise benefit from the 
Tribe’s senior right to hold water in the Lake.7 Where a grant of the Tribe’s claim has no adverse 
consequence on the State’s own non-consumptive claim (because there are no competing claims 
of sovereigns to differing diversions of a finite water resource), equitable apportionment plays no 
role in consideration of the Tribe’s in-situ Lake level claim.  
For this same reason, the State’s argument about the effect of the Tribe’s decision to cede 
part of the Lake must also fails. The State insists that the Tribe and United States demonstrated 
that maintenance of the Lake’s level was not critical to the Tribe when they reached an 
agreement whereby the Tribe ceded ownership of a portion of the Lake. State Br. 18. The State’s 
argument suggests that the Tribe therefore lacked interest in maintaining its right and that would 
necessarily lead to termination of the right. The State is mistaken on both legal and factual 
grounds. First as a matter of law, tribal rights may only be terminated through explicit action, not 
by implication. See Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404. Even if cession of a portion of the lakebed 
did demonstrate the (alleged) non-importance of the Lake to the Tribe, the Tribe would still not 
lose its federal right for Lake-level maintenance unless explicitly ceded or released. IUn any 
                                                          
7 Critically, the fact that the Tribe potentially benefits from the State’s right (and 
currently benefits from the Post Falls dam that holds Lake levels above the right claimed for the 
Tribe), does not mean that the Tribe has no need for its own water right or that the United States 
does not hold such a right for the Tribe. See NIWRG Br. 11. As discussed at note 8 below, the 
Tribe may not properly be deprived of its own property right to water in the Lake and instead be 
forced to rely on rights and licenses of other parties who may not elect to enforce those rights.  
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event, as a matter of fact, that the Tribe retained ownership of at least a portion of the Lake 
demonstrates its continuing importance to the Tribe. Indeed, Idaho II established that Congress 
sought a consensual transfer of some northern lands initially set aside for the Tribe, but the 
federal government did not renegotiate the purpose of the remaining Reservation lands, including 
supporting subsistence uses such a fishing, hunting, and gathering—all uses that depended on 
continued tribal control of Reservation waterways. 533 U.S. at 280–81. 
Also misplaced is the State’s further argument that the construction of a dam at Post Falls 
demonstrates that the United States does not hold a water right for the Tribe in Lake Coeur 
d’Alene, particularly a right to ensure that there is adequate outflow from the Lake to prevent it 
from becoming stagnant. State Br. 20. This argument rests on its faulty premise that the dam is 
somehow in conflict with the Tribe’s water right. To the contrary, the presence of the Post Falls 
dam currently ensures, as a practical matter, that the Tribe’s water right is satisfied. The United 
States has not requested that the Lake water right be “deferred” on this basis (State Br. 21); 
rather, the United States has asked that the right be recognized now through this adjudication so 
that if and when the Post Falls dam is removed or no longer operating, the Tribe will be able to 
rely on the recognized, enforceable water right reserved for it.8  
                                                          
8 Relatedly, the current practical reality that the Tribe’s right is met by present Lake 
inflows combined with the operation of the hydroelectric facility at Post Falls has no bearing on 
the existence of the Tribe’s federal water right. See NIWRG Br. 12. The FERC license for 
operation of the dam is of limited duration, and there is no guarantee that it will be renewed. See 
Avista Corp., 127 FERC 61,265, 62,187 (2009) (describing terms of license). This water 
adjudication, on the other hand, is meant to establish permanent rights. This adjudication is the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s one opportunity to have its rights recognized and quantified under Idaho 
law. See Idaho Code § 42-1420. It is thus critical that the adjudication establish the federal right 
to minimum Lake and inflow levels that will take effect if and when operations at Post Falls 
cease. Of course, the current level maintained by the dam has no bearing on whether a right to 
maintain the Lake’s level was necessary when the Reservation was established. See also United 
States Answering Br. in No. 45384, at 27. 
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Finally, the State argues without legal support that the Water Court correctly rejected the 
United States’ claim for maintenance of an outflow from Lake Coeur d’Alene because the 
specified point of measurement of such flow is outside the Reservation’s boundary. State Br. 19. 
The United States specified the outflow location—which is below the Post Falls dam—simply 
because that is a convenient and reasonable location at which to measure such flows using a flow 
gauge that is already in existence. The reserved water right, however, is independent of where it 
is measured. Moreover, and contrary to the State’s argument (State Br. 19–20), the Tribe’s 
conveyance of the downstream dam site in 1891 did not cede its water right in the Lake. See 
infra pp. 19–23 (regarding the severance of land ownership and water rights, discussed in the 
context of off-Reservation reserved rights to provide fish habitat). Such rights may only be lost 
through explicit action by Congress, and nothing in the 1891 Act purports to cede or transfer 
water rights. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1091 (available at R.2191). 
The Water Court erred when it failed to fully credit the Tribe’s diverse and important 
uses of the Lake Coeur d’Alene, as detailed in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and other 
federal courts in Idaho II. There is no proper basis for limiting the Tribe’s Lake-level right to 
serving only certain aspects of the Reservation’s homeland purpose. None of Objectors’ other 
arguments—such as that the Tribe lost its Lake-level rights by implication—fare any better. 
III. The Water Court erred by failing to recognize a tribal water right for plant 
gathering, which was an essential aspect of the Tribe’s way of life when the 
Reservation was established.  
The United States has also claimed non-consumptive rights for the Tribe—particularly 
for the maintenance of seeps, springs, and wetlands—based on the Tribe’s traditional suitable 
plant-gathering locations. As demonstrated in the United States’ opening brief (at 23–26), the 
Water Court’s rejection of this purpose failed to credit the centrality of plant gathering to the 
Tribe’s traditional way of life and is at odds with the Supreme Court’s recognition in Idaho II of 
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this important activity. The State’s response once again ignores Idaho II and fails to recognize 
the historical evidence supporting these reserved water rights claims.  
The State again fails to appreciate the federal reserved rights doctrine in arguing that the 
Tribe cannot have a water right for plant gathering absent an express right to the same. State Br. 
15. For one thing, a tribe has the right to gather on its own reservation. See Menominee Tribe, 
391 U.S. at 404, 406 (treaty setting aside Indian reservation impliedly included gathering rights); 
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (as a general rule, tribes enjoy the exclusive 
right to subsistence activities on lands reserved to them). The Tribe’s reserved water right also 
does not depend on an express plant-gathering right. While the Tribe’s implied water rights are 
based on the purpose of the 1873 Reservation, accomplishing that purpose (or those purposes) 
through recognition of a reserved water right may be implied and need not be express. For 
example, Arizona I’s recognition of water rights for the Colorado River Indian Reservation did 
not depend on any explicit statement in the reservation-creating order that the reservation was for 
tribal farming. But the historical circumstances demonstrated that the United States intended to 
facilitate agriculture, and so the Supreme Court found an implied reservation of water to 
accomplish that purpose through irrigation. 373 U.S. at 599–600. Here, the historical evidence 
amply demonstrates that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established in part to preserve 
traditional tribal plant-gathering sites. An implied right to an in situ use of water at such sites is 
necessarily part of such purpose.  
The State makes no effort to challenge the federal caselaw recognizing the centrality of 
plant gathering to the Tribe at the time of the Reservation’s establishment. See Idaho II, 533 U.S. 
at 265; United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1100–01, 1104 (D. Idaho 1998). Nor does it 
adequately credit the ample evidence of the Tribe’s reliance on this subsistence activity, which 
one expert called “the final pillar” (along with hunting and fishing), of the Tribe’s subsistence 
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cycle. R.659; see generally United States’ Br. as Appellant 24–25. The federal government 
recognized the importance of this activity in the lead-up to its initial effort to create a reservation 
for the Coeur d’Alene, as demonstrated by a report identifying what the government believed 
was an appropriate reservation location based in part on the availability of “berries & roots.” 
R.696. The State dismisses this evidence because the report was prepared in support of the 
executive order of 1867 that set aside a small reservation for the Tribe, rather than the 1873 
executive order that definitively established the Reservation in existence today. State Br. 16. But 
the State conveniently neglects to note that despite the United States’ apparent effort to satisfy 
the Tribe by creating a reservation that satisfied the need for “berries & roots,” the Tribe’s needs 
were not met by this small proposed reservation, and the Tribe accordingly insisted on a larger 
land base containing more of its ancestral lands.  
Indeed, in contrast to its current protestations in this Court, the State did not object before 
the Water Court to the statement by the United States and Tribe of the facts regarding gathering. 
That unrebutted statement explains that— 
• because the 1867 reservation “excluded their principal fisheries, village sites, and 
waterways, as well as some of their agricultural lands, the 1867 reservation threatened to 
undermine tribal members’ existence and lifeways,” which included “a continued 
reliance on . . . gathering[] and other traditional subsistence activities”;  
• the United States’ agreement to expand the reservation in 1873 “reflected tribal members’ 
desire to incorporate within the reservation may of the . . . gathering grounds upon which 
they had relied for centuries”; and 
• these facts demonstrate that “the purposes for which the federal government established 
the reservation in 1873 . . . reflected the [Tribe’s] ongoing reliance on their centuries-old 
traditional subsistence activities, including . . . berry picking[] and root gathering.”  
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R.2663–64 ⁋ 71 (citations to expert reports omitted).9 So while the State attempts to downplay 
the importance of gathering to the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the record demonstrates not only the 
opposite—that gathering, like hunting and fishing, was of central importance to the Tribe at the 
time its reservation was established in 1873—but also that the State itself did not contest the 
importance of gathering to the Tribe in the Water Court. The expanded Reservation was 
established in part to ensure that the Tribe had the ability to continue this activity. Accordingly, 
under Winters, a tribal water right was impliedly reserved for this purpose.  
IV. A tribal water right for commercial and industrial activities was reserved to provide 
the Tribe with flexible avenues for economic self-sufficiency into the future.  
The United States claimed water rights based on the Tribe’s commercial and industrial 
activities on the Reservation, predicated on the understanding: (1) that the establishment of the 
Reservation impliedly reserved waters necessary to provide a permanent homeland; (2) that the 
permanent-homeland purpose necessarily includes evolving water use over time; and (3) that 
current or currently-anticipated uses help inform the rights and quantities of use originally 
reserved. Because industrial and commercial uses were not historical or actual uses of the Coeur 
d’Alene Reservation in 1873, the Water Court viewed these uses as “secondary” uses that were 
not relevant to defining the overall reserved right. That view, and the State’s supporting 
argument, improperly limits a Tribe’s water rights to only those activities actually present at the 
time of reservation establishment. That limitation cannot be squared with the federal reserved 
rights doctrine.  
The State argues that Winters does not permit “modern” activities besides agriculture to 
serve as a potential basis for defining reserved water rights for a Tribe. State Br. 12. Initially, the 
State’s current position directly conflicts with its argument to the Water Court. There, the State 
                                                          
9 The State’s sole objection to the cited ⁋ 71 has no relevance to gathering. See R.3374. 
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correctly observed that Winters “agreed that water could be reserved for both ‘agriculture and the 
arts of civilization.’ ” R.2504 (State’s Memo. in Support of Mot. for S.J.). Winters did not have 
occasion to further address whether the Fort Belknap tribes in fact possessed a water right for the 
arts of civilization because the claim was not there presented, but that does not mean that such a 
right can never exist. After all, Winters was not a general stream adjudication, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court did not purport to determine the full extent and nature of water rights that 
accompany that reservation. That is, once the Court determined that the Fort Belknap tribes held 
a right for irrigated agriculture, the Court had no reason to consider—and did not consider—
questions about other reserved rights. 207 U.S. at 576–77. In fact, the full extent of federal 
reserved water rights for the Fort Belknap Reservation are the subject of a current state court 
adjudication in Montana. The United States as trustee has claimed reserved water rights—
including from the Milk River—on behalf of that reservation, including rights of use in addition 
to agriculture. See R.4221 (an example of Statement of Claim Form filed by the United States on 
behalf of the Fort Belknap Reservation). Finally, even if Winters had been a general stream 
adjudication and had determined that the Ft. Belknap Tribes possessed no water rights for “the 
arts of civilization,” that conclusion would be linked to the purpose and the circumstances of that 
reservation, which are not necessarily applicable to any other reservation.  
Tellingly, the State cites no authority that precludes a court from looking to examining 
current actual or anticipated industrial and commercial uses in order to adjudicate rights 
impliedly reserved for a “permanent homeland.” And applicable case law allows such 
examination. See Gila V, 35 P.3d at 74, 80–81 The State mistakenly relies (Br. at 13) on the 
Special Master’s report in Arizona v. California. But the Special Master there merely noted that 
the United States had not sought water for industrial and commercial uses—“only for enough 
water to satisfy future agricultural and related uses.” R.2235. That statement demonstrates only 
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that the Arizona I court was not presented with a claim to a reserved water right for industrial and 
commercial activities. And more generally, the Special Master’s report cited, and the ultimate 
Supreme Court decision reflects, the fact that reservations of land are accomplished with a 
definite view to future uses in addition to current uses. See R.2232 (reservation is to “establish 
areas that could be used in the indefinite future to satisfy the needs of Indian tribes . . . as those 
needs might develop”); Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600.  
The other cases cited by the State, like Washington Department of Ecology v. Yakima 
Reservation Irrigation District, 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993), could not preclude the water rights 
claimed for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe because they address the histories of those particular tribes 
and the negotiations and documents leading to the establishment of those reservations. Moreover, 
the broad principles applicable to the determination of tribal water rights supports the view that 
courts may look to post-reservation commercial and industrial uses or anticipated uses in 
defining federal reserved water rights for tribes, recognizing that reservations of land and water 
“looked to the needs of the Indians in the future.” United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist, 236 F.2d 
321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956); see also United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(rights reserved to Tribes need not be tied to traditional uses); Montana ex rel. Greely v. 
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 767, 768 (Mont. 1985) (reservation 
includes “water for future needs and changes in use” and serves “the federal goal of Indian self 
sufficiency”); In re Crow Water Compact, 364 P.3d 584, 589 (Mont. 2015) (“[U]nder Winters 
and its progeny the tribe has a right to water for development of industrial interests.”).10  
The State further imagines that the United States would have sought to achieve 
                                                          
10 The State argues (Br. at 14) that In re Crow Water Compact should be discounted 
because the court was approving a water rights compact rather than reviewing a water rights 
adjudication, but that context does not diminish the Montana Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
principles in Winters and its progeny.  
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“civilization” of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe through agriculture alone, and not through commercial 
or industrial activities. State Br. 12. As before, the State presents a new argument to this Court 
that conflicts with the State’s own prior argument in the Water Court that “One Purpose of the 
Reservation was to Promote Commercial and Industrial Activities.” R.2504. The State’s 
argument before the Water Court pointed to the 1891 Act (which the State argues in its related 
appeal, No. 45381, established a new reservation that superseded the 1873 Reservation). But the 
activities and factors identified in the 1891 Act (which called for a “saw and grist mill,” for 
training of tribal members to be “millers, engineers, and mechanics,” and for promotion of “the 
progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization” of the Tribe) were essentially the 
same as those underlying the 1873 executive order in promoting commerce and industry. For 
instance, the 1873 stated that the government would provide, among other things, wagons, 
plows, mowers, a grain cradler, and a grist mill; “1 grist and 1 saw miller and 1 blacksmith” who 
would “teach the Indians to perform such labor”; and funds for “schools, and for such articles of 
comfort and for the civilization” of the Coeur d’Alene. See R.2642, ¶ 30; R.1866.11 Indeed, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has expressly recognized that a reservation established “to encourage, assist 
and protect” a tribe in its efforts to “advance to the ways of civilized life,” as was the Coeur 
d’Alene Reservation, necessarily included “opportunit[ies] for industrial and commercial 
development.” Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). 
In short, while courts have often considered agricultural uses in defining federal reserved 
water rights for tribes, nothing in the reserved-rights doctrine requires that reserved rights be 
                                                          
11 Highlighting the State’s change in position between the Water Court and this Court, the 
State now relies on a 1889 document in support of a new argument that “the ‘civilization’ of 
tribes was to be achieved not through commercial or industrial activities, but through farming” 
alone. State Br. 12. But before the Water Court, the State made no such argument, and it instead 
insisted that water for industrial and commercial uses exclude only certain types of industrial and 
commercial development. R.2506–07.  
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limited to agricultural uses or amounts reasonably required for such uses. Where actual and 
anticipated tribal uses have evolved after the establishment of an Indian reservation but before 
the adjudication of reserved water rights, courts can and should look to current and currently-
anticipated uses as a reasonable measure of rights impliedly reserved for a “permanent 
homeland.” See Gila V, 35 P.3d at 74, 80–81. This is especially true in light of the general rule 
that water-rights holders are free to change the place of use or nature of use of a water right over 
time, as long as the change is without injury to other users. See Beecher v. Cassia Creek Irr. Co., 
154 P.2d 507, 509 (Idaho 1944). Here, Objectors do not contend that recognizing rights of use 
for industrial and commercial activities will result in a greater consumptive use than impliedly 
reserved in 1873 to meet the Reservation’s permanent homeland purpose.12 Instead, they insist 
that rights for industrial and commercial use must be categorically disallowed and that the Water 
Court may not consider reasonable industrial and commercial uses as a measure of water 
impliedly reserved as necessary to provide a permanent tribal homeland. There is no viable 
authority supporting either proposition.  
V. The claimed reserved instream flow rights serve a critical aspect of the 
Reservation’s purpose and are not dependent on tribal ownership or control of the 
specific lands over which those waters flow.  
The United States claimed reserved rights to maintain in-stream flows both inside and 
outside of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation’s boundaries. Regardless of location, these flows share 
a single common basis: they provide upstream habitat for adfluvial fish that the Tribe takes and 
has always taken from Lake Coeur d’Alene and its tributaries where the Tribe has fishing rights. 
These reserved water rights do not depend on Tribal upstream land ownership, nor do they 
provide the Tribe a right of access to upstream areas. Instead, the entire basis of the claimed 
                                                          
12 And recall that the quantum of reserved water rights will be determined in the next 
phase of this adjudication.  
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reserved rights is to provide the necessary upstream habitat for the survival of these fish 
populations and to ensure sufficient fish return to satisfy the Tribe’s on-Reservation fishing right. 
The Water Court agreed that the United States may hold on-Reservation instream rights, but it 
rejected these instream flow claims to the extent they are outside the Reservation based on its 
interpretation of the purpose of the Reservation as not including an intent to provide instream 
flows in ceded areas. But the Water Court’s approach addresses the wrong question: the court 
recognized that maintaining the Tribe’s access to its fishery was part of the Reservation’s 
purpose, and the proper question is whether water is necessary to accomplish that use. The 
record in this case establishes that the fishery without question depends on the availability of 
upstream habitat for the adfluvial fish. A right for upstream flows is thus implied by the 
reservation of downstream land for the Tribe.  
The State’s and other Objectors’ responses to the United States’ opening brief similarly 
rest on misconceptions on the source and scope of the claimed water rights. For instance, the 
State and NIWRG argue that the off-Reservation instream flow claims are impermissible because 
they must be tied to a reservation of land and cannot exist independent of the reservation of land. 
State Br. 23; NIWRG Br. 13. But these instream flow claims are tied to a reservation of land—
the land within the present Coeur d’Alene Reservation on which the Tribe accesses its fishery. It 
is beyond dispute that the Tribe bargained for an enlarged Reservation to ensure that it was able 
to continue fishing. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 265–66. A reservation of water rights to facilitate that 
activity is implied from the reservation of land for which the Tribe successfully bargained. The 
upstream waters claimed are not independent of this reservation; they are inherently tied to it. 
See United States’ Br. as Appellant 34 (describing biological basis of the upstream flow claims); 
Kittitas Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 763 F.2d 1032, 1033–35 
(9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the need for sufficient off-reservation water to support the spawning 
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portion of the salmon’s lifecycle).13 The State argues that the United States is not seeking “to 
enjoin off-reservation water users ‘to serve on-reservation uses of water’ ” (which the State 
concedes is proper), but instead is claiming water rights “to preserve off-reservation instream 
habitat” (which the States deems improper). State Br. 24. But the State posits an imaginary 
distinction. The reserved right preserves instream habitat to serve on-reservation uses by 
potentially enjoining other off-reservation water users. The whole point of preserving the 
instream flows is to ensure that adfluvial fish that the Tribe takes on the Reservation have 
adequate water to spawn upstream. In this way, and contrary to the State’s argument (State Br. 
25), these water rights are appurtenant to Reservation lands: the upstream waters are tied to the 
Reservation through use and through hydrological connection to the Lake. See United States’ Br. 
as Appellant 34–37.  
The State nonetheless suggests that more is required. State Br. 23 (citing, e.g., Ahtanum 
Irrigation District, 236 F.2d at 325). The cited case presented the question whether a reservation 
bounded on one side by a creek also impliedly included the reservation of water to be diverted 
for irrigation. The court did state that the reservation’s boundary is deemed by implication to 
extend to the middle of the creek, as a side note “of no significance.” 236 F.2d at 325. But the 
court’s analysis of whether that tribe was entitled to an implied water right rested on Winters’ 
core question: whether the tribe would have given up its aboriginal lands to be confined on a 
reservation without such a water right. Id. at 325–26; see also Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 
161 F. 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1908) (applying Winters and concluding that “the policy of the 
                                                          
13 While Kittitas is not a water adjudication case, as the State correctly notes (State Br. 
26), it is cited for the proposition that courts have credited just the type of fish-lifecycle evidence 
that the United States and Tribe have provided in this case in support of the off-Reservation 
instream flow rights. In the subsequent adjudication of rights, the state court recognized that 
“[f]ish life cannot be maintained without a place for fish to spawn” and so recognized a right to 
water in “an amount necessary to maintain fish life in the Yakima River.” R.2308.  
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government to reserve whatever water . . . may be reasonably necessary, not only for present 
uses, but for future requirements,” is clear). In any event, the Ninth Circuit recently clarified in 
Katie John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013), that off-reservation waters may 
be tied to reserved lands where there is a “relationship between reserved federal land and the use 
of the water.”  
For similar reasons, Hecla and NIWRG miss the mark in arguing that the United States 
may hold instream flow rights only in the same location in which the Tribe has fishing rights. 
Hecla Br. 28; NIWRG Br. 19. The existence of instream flow rights is not based on a tribal right 
to fish at those specific off-Reservation locations, and recognizing instream flow rights outside 
the Reservation will not also confer upon the Tribe a right to fish in those upstream locations.14 
The State improperly relies on Western Shoshone National Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 203 
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Washington, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1201 (W.D. Wash. 1991); 
and Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 461 (7th Cir. 1998). But 
none of these cases concerns water rights, and the United States’ instream flow claims here are 
not premised on the notion that tribal hunting and fishing rights persist on lands that are outside 
the current Reservation boundaries. See State Br. 31. The State is mistaken as well in arguing 
that the Tribe’s property interest in fish ceases once the fish leave tribal property. State Br. 28. 
These reserved instream flow rights are not premised on a property interest in fish, nor on a 
claimed right to protect and regulate wildlife outside of tribal property; they are premised only 
on the Tribe’s right to take fish on the Reservation, an aboriginal right that was protected through 
the creation of the Reservation in 1873. The fulfillment of that right depends on the availability 
                                                          
14 Reliance on the Nez Perce Tribe case is inapt for this reason, as well as for the 
additional reason that it considered only whether that tribe’s right to fish “in common with the 
citizens of the territory” outside its reservation also implied a reserved water right. R.848, 852.  
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of upstream waters necessary for the fish populations to survive. No more is needed to recognize 
an implied reservation of water. The United States’ claim based on this implied reservation of 
water is not meaningfully different from the United States’ other reserved-rights claims.  
Relatedly, Objectors’ arguments belie a confusion of two separate factors—ownership of 
water rights, and ownership of lands (including submerged lands). In a prior appropriation 
system like Idaho’s, ownership of submerged lands does not grant a right to use water, and vice 
versa. The practical effect of a prior appropriation regime is that a senior appropriator without 
waterfront property may have a right to divert water to benefit its landlocked property while its 
riverfront neighbor may have a water right so junior that it is unable to divert any water at all. 
This extreme example simply demonstrates the severance of land ownership and water rights: a 
right to the use of water is not necessarily held by the same entity as holds the land across which 
that water flows. For this reason the State is incorrect in arguing that the cession of lands—
including waterways—by the Tribe through an 1889 agreement necessarily affected water rights 
as well. State Br. 28. This distinction explains why, even where the Tribe accepted the offer of a 
permanent homeland on a reservation in exchange for relinquishing its title to its broader 
aboriginal lands, that agreement did not also mean that the Tribe accepted the premise that it 
would have no rights with respect to water outside the Reservation. This distinction also explains 
why cited like United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, 314 U.S. 339, 357–58 
(1941), cited in State Br. 27, are inapposite. That case simply represents a premise not at issue 
here that where a tribe agrees to be confined on a reservation, it releases its rights to lands 
outside the reservation. Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983), is similarly 
unhelpful to Objectors: as Hecla acknowledges immediately after citing the case in support of its 
argument that the Tribe does not have off-Reservation water rights, neither that case, nor Idaho 
II, “addressed water rights for the Reservation.” Hecla Br. 11.  
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The State mistakenly relies on Idaho II for the proposition that the Tribe ceded its water 
rights, stating that the Supreme Court “understood the Tribe’s cession to include not only land, 
but waters.” State Br. 32. As the State must be aware, Idaho II concerned ownership of 
submerged lands (and, as part of the inquiry, the purpose of the Reservation) but did not present 
the question of off-Reservation water rights. Consequently, the Supreme Court certainly did not 
reach the “exact conclusion” the State urges here: that the cessation of “land” also necessarily is 
a cessation of water rights. State Br. 32. Instead, Idaho II held that the Tribe’s historic use of 
Lake Coeur d’Alene and related waters was so instrumental to its way of life that the Tribe 
overcame the presumption that submerged lands within its Reservation would pass to the State of 
Idaho upon its admission to the Union. 533 U.S. at 273–74. Idaho II did not consider and did not 
hold that when the Tribe agreed to cede “land,” it also silently ceded water rights that continue to 
serve its Reservation. Cf. id. at 278 (no evidence that Congress acted to “pull a fast one” on the 
Tribe by silently depriving Tribe of submerged lands under Lake Coeur d’Alene). See also 
Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404 (federal government’s termination of Indians’ recognized rights 
must be explicit). 
The State and Hecla fare no better in arguing that when the Tribe ceded a portion of its 
Reservation by agreement in 1889, those lands returned to the public domain, thereby 
demonstrating federal policy to prioritize mineral development (Hecla) or homesteading and 
private appropriation (State). State Br. 33–34; Hecla Br. 32. While it is true that ceded lands 
were made available for homesteading and mineral development, it is not also true that junior 
water rights associated with these post-cession uses trump the senior reserved rights for the 
Tribe. The instream rights claimed here have a time-immemorial priority date, recognizing that 
the Tribe’s use of these waters predated settlement by Europeans and early Americans. That this 
priority date is senior to all other water rights is not a reason to reject these claims; it is simply a 
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fact of the American West that tribes’ traditional use of water came first in time, and the priority 
of rights tied to that use is a legal result of Idaho’s prior appropriation regime, which provides 
that first-in-time is also first-in-right. See Clear Springs Foods, Inc v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71, 96 
(Idaho 2011); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412–14 (9th Cir. 1983) (describing 
general principles underlying the recognition of a time-immemorial priority date).  
Hecla also asserts several arguments joined by no other Objectors. Hecla suggests that, 
under Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Idaho 2000), the Tribe cannot have a 
right to maintain instream flows because such a right is only available if, without it, the 
Reservation would not be “fit for habitation.” Hecla 20–21. But that consideration is only part of 
the Winters inquiry, as Potlatch itself acknowledges: that inquiry also requires the court to assess 
what was the “consideration for the agreement if the tribe gave up land and did not receive the 
benefit of water to make the land they retained habitable.” Potlatch, 12 P.3d at 1264. Viewed in 
this light, and given the ample record evidence that the Tribe’s fishery necessarily depends on 
the availability of upstream flows for spawning, it is clear that the Tribe would not have agreed 
to cede upstream flow rights that would undermine the retention of Lake Coeur d’Alene that the 
Tribe worked hard to secure. Put another way, when the Reservation was created, all parties—
and most certainly the Tribe—would have understood that part of what would make the 
Reservation habitable was the availability of fish in the Lake; absent adequate spawning habitat 
for the fish, the Tribe cannot ensure that its Reservation does, in fact, remain fit for its use.  
Hecla relies on United States v. State, 23 P.3d 117 (Idaho 2001) (“Deer Flat”), for the 
proposition that the reservation of upstream waters cannot be recognized simply because fish 
“might be attracted” to those waters. Hecla Br. 22. But Hecla’s reliance is misplaced, as Deer 
Flat concerned the federal government’s reservation of islands in the Snake River to create 
sanctuaries for migrating birds to protect them from hunting. 23 P.3d at 125. This Court held that 
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because these sanctuaries—as defined by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act—would continue 
to exist even if there were no longer enough water in the Snake River to maintain these areas as 
islands, the United States’ purpose in creating the reservations did not include a reservation of 
water as well. Id. at 126. This non-Indian case involves a narrowly-defined reservation of land 
for a use that the Court determined does not require water; it has no bearing on whether a 
reservation that will be “held forever as Indian land,” R.2665, R.1874, includes an implied water 
right for a Tribe’s continued ability to fish—an activity that unquestionably does require water.  
Finally, Hecla argues that United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905), does not 
support the recognition of off-Reservation instream flow rights here, suggesting that such rights 
must be expressly reserved. Hecla Br. 27. This argument turns Winans on its head: the case 
directs that interpretation of an agreement to confine a tribe to a reservation is guided by the 
principle that such a reservation “was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right 
from them—a reservation of those not granted. 198 U.S. at 381; see also Pocatello, 180 P.3d 
1057. In Winans, the fishing rights were expressly enumerated, but the Court also found an 
implied tribal right to “such easements as enable the [fishing] right to be exercised.” 198 U.S. at 
384. The implied water rights claimed here need not be express. Indeed, in Winters, the treaty at 
issue made no mention of water, yet the Supreme Court found a senior water right for Indians, 
even to the detriment of subsequent non-Indian appropriators. 207 U.S. at 568–69.15  
                                                          
15 Relatedly, Hecla’s complaint that the instream flow claims would prevent it from 
appropriating any water (Hecla Br. 8), is not a factor in determining the reserved rights available 
to the Tribe, as there is no balancing test for the adjudication of federal water rights (or, for that 
matter, under a prior appropriation system generally). See, e.g., In re All Rights to Use Water in 
Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 94 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that the question of effects on 
other users “does not apply to the question of intent to reserve water”); Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 
850 P.2d at 1317 (“a court is not to balance the competing interests of Indian and non-Indian 
water users to reach an ‘equitable apportionment’ ”); Colville Confed. Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 
397, 405 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Where reserved rights are properly implied, they arise without regard to 
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In short, Objectors do not dispute the biological basis of the upstream flow rights to 
support the tribe’s Lake Coeur d’Alene fishery, and their legal objections largely rest on a 
misunderstanding of the basis of the claims and a misapplication of law. Objectors, like the 
Water Court, err by failing to recognize that because one of the key tribal activities underlying 
creation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation—i.e., fishing—depends on water, water is reserved to 
accomplish that activity, regardless of the location of the instream flows required.  
VI. The Tribe’s rights to maintain seeps, springs, and wetlands were never “lost” 
through nonuse and maintain their time-immemorial priority date.  
The United States has claimed a time-immemorial priority date for all non-consumptive 
water rights that serve traditional tribal rights, including hunting, fishing, and gathering. Some of 
those rights are for the maintenance of seeps, springs, and wetlands. These waters provide habitat 
for animals and plants hunted and gathered by the Tribe, much as it has done throughout its 
history. Certain of these rights are located on lands that left tribal and federal ownership early in 
the 20th century under the United States’ allotment policy. The Water Court ruled these rights 
were lost to the Tribe because non-Indian landowners were not able to hold and maintain these 
rights, which are available only to tribal members; where these lands were reacquired by Tribe or 
tribal members, these non-consumptive rights may hold a date-of-reacquisition priority date, but 
the original priority date is lost. As the United States explained in its opening brief (at 38–42), 
this conclusion was not required by any law, and the Court could better effectuate the purpose of 
the federal reserved rights doctrine by recognizing the seniority of these non-consumptive rights. 
The State argues that these non-consumptive rights cannot have a time-immemorial 
                                                          
equities that may favor competing water users.”); Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138–39 & n.4 (holding that 
there is no “balancing test” in determining an implied reservation of water). The fact that a junior 
water right holder’s diversion may be limited by enforcement of a senior water right holder’s 
rights is simply a fact of life in Idaho’s prior appropriation regime. See, e.g., Moe v. Harger, 77 
P. 645 (Idaho 1904).  
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priority date because that ultimate senior priority must be based on “uninterrupted use and 
occupation of land and water.” State Br. 39. The State does not dispute that the Tribe’s non-
consumptive use of these waters was uninterrupted at the time of the establishment of the Coeur 
d’Alene Reservation. State Br. 39. Instead, it insists that the allotment policy and allotment of 
subject lands broke the chain and leaves the Tribe without a time-immemorial date for seeps, 
springs, and wetlands on reacquired lands.  
But the broad principles in Adair, upon which the State relies, support the original 
priority dates here. Adair held that the Klamath Tribe’s non-consumptive rights for hunting and 
fishing persisted even through the allotment of that reservation. 723 F.2d at 1398, 1412. The 
same should be true here. Aboriginal rights like hunting, fishing, and gathering, are collectively-
held rights that benefit the Tribe and the Reservation as a whole. These non-consumptive rights 
cannot be held by non-Indians, and so there was no other user to “interrupt” the Tribe’s exclusive 
use. Instead, between allotment and reacquisition, there was a period during which the rights 
went dormant—unused (and unable to be used) by the Tribe or anyone else. But nonuse does not 
equal loss for tribal water rights. Walton, 647 F.2d at 51. Also, this lapse in the Tribe’s use was 
not a significant break in the Tribe’s undisputed use of these waters since long before non-Indian 
settlement of this area. Although particular seeps, springs, and wetlands on particular lands may 
have left tribal control, in no case did the lands on which the United States has claimed these 
waters leave the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. Now that these features have returned to tribal 
control, they once again contribute to the Reservation’s purpose of providing a tribal 
homeland.16  
                                                          
16 That the United States did not claim rights to seeps, springs, and wetlands outside of 
tribal lands within the Reservation was a pragmatic choice and does not demonstrate anything 
about the legal basis for the rights that the United States has claimed. See State Br. 40.  
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The State argues that allowing dormant non-consumptive rights to regain an enforceable 
time-immemorial priority date upon reacquisition is unfair to intervening non-Indian owners. Br. 
39–40. But alleged unfairness to more junior users is not a factor in determining the priority of 
tribal water rights. See supra note 15. Moreover, United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363 
(9th Cir. 1984), upon which the State relies, concerned only priority for consumptive (not non-
consumptive) tribal water rights, and the State fails to respond the United States’ arguments why 
Anderson should be limited to the consumptive-right context. See United States’ Br. as Appellant 
40–41. 
In short, maintenance of a time-immemorial priority date for these non-consumptive uses 
best allows the Reservation to serve its purpose, consistent with Congress’s stated policy in 
ending the period of allotment and homesteading: “[t]o conserve and develop Indian lands and 
resources.” Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. at 984.  
VII. Hecla’s arguments for reversal of some aspects of the Water Court’s decision should 
be stricken, as Hecla did not pursue its own separate appeal. 
In its answering brief, Hecla presents lines of argument that are not responsive to the 
United States’ appeal and that are properly available only in an affirmative appeal by Hecla. 
Namely, Hecla argues that no water right should have been recognized for hunting and fishing 
(Hecla Br. 29–30), or for agriculture (Hecla Br. 23–24), and that Winters rights can have a 
priority date no earlier than the date of reservation (Hecla Br. 19). These arguments should be 
stricken because they are not responsive to the opening briefs of the United States (or the Tribe), 
and are instead arguments that aspects of the Water Court’s decision that were favorable to the 
United States and the Tribe should be reversed. Hecla did not elect to appeal that decision and 
therefore may not make affirmative arguments for reversal in an answering brief: “an appellee 
who does not cross-appeal may not ‘attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own 
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rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary.’ ” Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S.Ct. 
793, 798 (2015) (quoting United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924)); see 
also State v. Fisher, 93 P.3d 696, 703 (Idaho 2004) (“if the respondent seeks affirmative relief of 
a judgement, order, or decree, then a cross-appeal is required rather than presenting the issue as 
an additional issue on appeal.”).  
To the extent the Court nonetheless addresses the merits of these improper arguments by 
Hecla, the United States respectfully directs the Court to its answering brief in NIWRG’s appeal, 
which raises similar arguments regarding hunting, fishing, and agricultural rights. See United 
States’ Answering Br. in No. 45384, at 26–34. As to Hecla’s argument regarding the availability 
of a time-immemorial priority date, its entire argument rests on a case about the reservation of a 
national forest, see Avondale Irrigation District v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9 
(Idaho 1978), which has no time-immemorial basis (unlike the traditional subsistence uses of an 
Indian tribe). By contrast, tribes’ traditional rights are entitled to a time-immemorial priority 
date, because aboriginal rights are “not created by” an agreement between a tribe and the federal 
government; rather, such an agreement “confirmed the continued existence of these rights.” 
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678–81); Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the decision of the Water Court 
insofar as it (1) rejected the United States’ water claims not directly tied to hunting, fishing, 
domestic, and agricultural uses; (2) rejected its claims for instream flow outside Reservation 
lands; and (3) imposed an improper priority date on Reservation lands that have been reacquired 
by the Tribe.  
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